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In February of 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt gifted a fully equipped C-47 to King Ibn 
Saud of Saudi Arabia—inadvertently creating the first Rolls-Royce since the start of World War 
II. Winston Churchill expedited the creation of a custom-made Rolls-Royce for King Ibn Saud in 
order to rival America’s gift of a military aircraft.1 Two of the world’s most powerful Western 
powers contended for the favor of King Ibn Saud because of the West’s desperate need for 
Middle Eastern oil. In the aftermath of World War II, oil in the Middle East became an important 
point of concession for the new oil dependent world—particularly in oil deficient Europe. The 
U.S. oil company Standard Oil Company of California (CASOC) pumped oil from Saudi Arabia 
to sell internationally since 1938, thus giving the U.S. a stake in the oil trade and Saudi Arabia a 
much-needed economic boost. This marked the beginning of the long-lasting relationship 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia based on co-dependency for oil production. The nature of the 
U.S.-Saudi relationship turned more political as the Cold War progressed and Saudi Arabia 
proved to be a reliant ally against Soviet communism in the region. The Saudi Royal Family’s 
reliance upon the fundamental form of Islam known as Wahhabism made Saudi Arabia the 
perfect ally to stop the spread of atheistic communism in the Middle East. The U.S. continued to 
give the King of Saudi Arabia the latest military equipment to ensure the Kingdom survived and 
thereby carry out U.S. interests in the region. Originally, the prioritized protection of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was to ensure the protection of oil production, but the country served 
well against the fight of communism in the region from 1945 onwards. From 1945-1953 the 
United States replaced Britain as an imperial power in Southwest Asia by making Saudi Arabia 
financially and militarily dependent on it; the U.S. used this influence to support the creation of 
the state of Israel.  
                                                          
1 Irving Wallace, "Nabob's Chariot," The Saturday Evening Post (Indianapolis), November 8, 1947, accessed March 
18, 2019, https://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/issues/1947-11-08/. 
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During the Great Depression King Ibn Saud was looking to give an oil concessions to a 
Western power to make up revenue lost from the decline in pilgrims on Hajj.2 One of the most 
important factors in the U.S.-Saudi relationship—oil—was officially established in 1933 with the 
Standard Oil Company of California. British oil companies had a monopoly on sources of known 
oil in Iraq, Iran, and other Gulf states. Larger oil companies such as Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(supplying 80 percent of allied oil during WWII) and Socony-Vacuum gained a total of 23.75 
percent shares from Britain’s Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). These larger American oil 
companies joined IPC on the condition that they would not look for oil within the old Ottoman 
Empire.3 This allowed smaller companies like SOCAL to gain oil concession rights in the 
Persian Gulf. SOCAL found commercial levels of oil in 1938 under its subsidiary California 
Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), later changed to Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO). After Saudi oil was found in commercial quantities, King Ibn Saud turned down 
larger bids for oil concessions in order to remain loyal to their agreement with SOCAL/CASOC.4 
Saudi Arabia hoped to bring the U.S. into a mostly British imperialist Middle East to stop Britain 
from extending its sphere of influence directly into Saudi Arabia. Additionally, King Ibn Saud 
showed willingness to side with the U.S. over intervening European powers—even when offered 
larger sums of money.  
Three more American oil companies (Texas Oil Company (who bought out SOCAL), 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and Socony Vacuum Oil Company) dropped their alliance 
                                                          
2 The Hajj is an annual pilgrimage made by millions of Muslims to the holy cities Mecca and Medina. Due to the 
Great Depression many would be pilgrims were not able to make it to Saudi Arabia. This greatly effected the Saudi 
Arabian economy. 
3 Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, (Oxford University Press, 
2006), 15-16. 
4 Ibid., 17-19. 
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with IPC to buy investments with from ARAMCO by 1948.5 Without the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia ensuring an American oil company received the concessions, the U.S.’s investment and 
involvement in the Middle East might have been severely limited. The government needed the 
concessionary money in order to keep its reign in the region. The Saud monarchy was willing to 
make a relationship with the U.S. work despite the unhappiness of their people dealing directly 
with the Americans drilling oil in the region.6 Saudi Arabia choose to create close ties with U.S. 
oil companies because of their distrust of European powers (specifically Britain) and the U.S.’s 
strong economy.  
Although the Saudi Arabian economy—and thus the population—depended on the oil 
revenue collected from sales to Western countries, the state religious practice of Wahhabism had 
a clear intolerance of those who do not practice this form of Islam. This sect of Islam does not 
only discriminate against followers of other religions, but also denies the validity of other sects 
of Islam. Wahhabism has driven a wedge against Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern 
countries as it justifies the Saud family’s claim as guardians of the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was first established in the mid-eighteenth century with 
an alliance made between the household of the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-
Wahhab, and the leader of the Saud house, Muhammad ibn Saud. The alliance between these two 
respected households is the foundation of the Kingdom. It is impossible to question the 
fundamentalist approach Wahhabism takes to Islam without also undermining the Saud’s claim 
as protectors of the holy cities. Although Wahhabism has been used by the Saud regime to keep 
order amongst the people, the U.S. has also used Wahhabism to keep Communism at bay in 
                                                          
5 R. Narayanan, "A Review of Oil Contract Negotiations By Saudi Arabia With Aramco," International Studies 7, 
no. 4 (1965): 568-573, accessed March 9, 2019, doi:10.1177/002088176500700403. 
6 Abdul Rahman Munif, Cities of Salt. Beirut: Random House, 1987. 
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Southwest Asia by battling Arab nationalism and socialism. And though Saudi Arabia remains 
the U.S’s closest ally in the Middle East, its perverse sect of Islam may threaten ties with 
Western allies which they depend on economically. The U.S.-Saudi policy of supporting 
fundamentalist Islam in Southwest Asia has had adverse effects for the U.S. because groups like 
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant justify their horrendous actions through 
Wahhabism.7 
The Saudi Arabian government is consistently accused of abusing funds by Western 
media, but the structure of the Saudi Arabian government is based off an older monarchial 
system. In practice, the Saudi government used funds to buy off the loyalty of local tribes and 
clans to keep them happy.8 In part, this system of buying loyalty is how King Ibn Saud was able 
to successfully take back power for the Saud family. The royal family is also accused of abusing 
funds for their personal lives, but the Saud family represent the state and control all funds and 
many positions of power remain in the family. Through this nepotism, the Princes participate in 
all posts within the government to gain experience. The monarchy of Saudi Arabia is unique in 
that the order of succession was determined largely by agnatic seniority until 2006. This type of 
monarchy promotes the brothers of the monarch as King before the sons of the monarch. This 
system ensures that brothers work to support the current monarch because they are eligible to 
rule. King Ibn Saud was adamant that his sons not fight over the throne because family in-
fighting had destroyed the second reign of the Saud family. The familial structure of the 
government promotes the oldest and most well-trained brothers to governmental positions of 
power after they have gained enough experience. The structure of the Saudi government differs 
                                                          
7 Muharrem Hilmi Özev, "Saudi Society and the State: Ideational and Material Basis," (Arab Studies Quarterly 39, 
no. 4 2017): 1004, Accessed February 2018. doi:10.13169/arabstudquar.39.4.0996. 
8 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 29-33. 
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so strongly from the U.S. that it is often looked down upon by Americans for being so 
traditional.  
 The study of U.S.-Saudi relations has increased since the attacks on the World Trade 
Centers on September 11 revealed that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens.9 Historians set 
out to understand how one of the U.S.’s greatest allies in the Middle East became one of the 
biggest producers of terrorists in Southwest Asia and how this puts pressure on the once strong 
bond between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Rachel Bronson’s Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy 
Partnership with Saudi Arabia is the most extensively done research into U.S.-Saudi relations. 
10Her main argument is centered around three pillars that affect every aspect of the U.S-Saudi 
relationship: oil, Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the region, and Saudi Arabia’s intolerance 
for Communism based on religion.11 These three pillars appealed to the U.S. throughout the 
twentieth century and ensured the U.S.-Saudi alliance remained intact. This paper will make use 
of Bronson’s three pillars and build upon her established work to determine the U.S.’s ulterior 
motives in the Middle East.  
 Bruce Riedel’s Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR is 
another heavily researched account of the U.S.-Saudi relationship that documented the 
relationship the Saudi monarch’s had with U.S. Presidents.12 Riedel’s career of working with the 
Central Intelligence Agency offers him valuable background to better explain the interpersonal 
workings of the Saud Royal Family. Like Bronson, Riedel covers the past between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia in order to better understand the present relationship. Riedel helped build the 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 8. 
10 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 14- 
11 Ibid., 21-27. 
12 Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR, (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2018). 
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modern U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia from 1980 until 2006 as CIA analyst and counter-
terrorism expert. His book explores the unique relationship dynamic between U.S. Presidents and 
officials and members of the Saud royal family. The author’s knowledge of and relationship to 
the royal family establishes the royal family’s point of view. Riedel’s book seeks to explain that 
Saudi Arabia has been a valuable U.S. ally and should not be discounted because of the 
September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centers.13  
 The long-standing alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is not well understood, in 
part due to the stark differences of the two countries. The U.S. is a democratic nation that 
protects free speech and the right of freedom of the press. In contrast, the Saud Royal Family 
controls every aspect of the country’s press and is considered an authoritarian monarchy. Geoff 
Simons reveals the negative aspects of the Kingdom in Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client 
Feudalism.14 Simons focuses specifically on the corruption of the Saudi government and its 
human rights violations. Within the context of the U.S.-Saud relationship, the nepotism, 
corruption, and brutality within the Saudi government is often overlooked, while U.S. democracy 
is extolled. Simons clearly criticizes the U.S. for not demanding that Saudi Arabia modernize 
and adhere to human rights standards set by the United Nations. Comparisons made between the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia based on laws and government structure are ineffective and unfair 
because Saudi Arabia is still classified as a developing country15—in addition to the religious 
and cultural differences of Saudi Arabia that make it difficult for the Saud Royal Family to 
change if they wanted to.  
                                                          
13 Ibid., ix-xv. 
14 Geoff Simons, Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism, (NY: St. Martin's, 1998). 
15 "Human Development Reports," Developing Regions, Human Development Reports, accessed June 04, 2019, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/developing-regions. 
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 Saudi Arabia has immense power as an Islamic leader in the Middle East because it holds 
the two holiest cities in Islam. They are the self-proclaimed protectors of Mecca and Medina and 
they have the protection of the U.S. behind them. It is difficult to talk about the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabian relationship without bringing up other countries and events in the Middle East. As allies 
they attempt to control actions in the region. Robert Dreyfuss explores the effects of the U.S.’s 
intervention in the Middle East and explains how the U.S. has supported and expanded 
fundamentalist Islam in Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist 
Islam.16 He accuses Saudi Arabia of encouraging terrorist activities, in large part due to their 
adherence to Wahhabi Islam. Dreyfus describes U.S. as a backer of fundamentalist Islam—thus 
supporting Islamic terrorism and authoritarianism within the region. The Saud family is often 
connected to radical Islam, but Saudi Arabia had problems with internal radicals as well. The 
regime is often criticized for being too close to the U.S. by the rest of the Islamic world, despite 
their conservative practice of Islam.  
 Although Saudi Arabia is a developing country, but it is also considered a high-income 
country based on its gross domestic product (GPD).17 Muharrem Hilmi Ӧzev explores the 
economic reliance Saudi Arabia has on oil and the trouble this is causing Saudi Arabia in an 
increasingly less oil dependent world in his article: “Saudi Society and the State: Ideational and 
Material Basis.”18 Oil and gas exports are responsible for roughly 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 
GPD and 85 percent of their export.19 This was not as true before the oil boom of 1973. The 
country’s government had a surplus of money and used it to modernize the state. Significant 
                                                          
16 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam, (Dell Publishing, 
2006). 
17 "Human Development Reports," Developing Regions. 
18 Özev, "Saudi Society and the State.” 
19 “Saudi Arabia,” OPEC: Saudi Arabia, accessed February 01, 2018, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm.  
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improvements were made to the economy, social welfare, and education. Before the oil boom, 
Saudi Arabia relied on foreign aid and trade revenue. After Saudi Arabia became a rentier state, 
the country became dependent on international relations to sell its oil. Ӧzev sees a clear problem 
with Saudi Arabia depending upon oil revenue as its only source of income. Saudi Arabia’s 
attempt to modernize conflicts with its welfare state system and the country doesn’t have enough 
jobs to support its exploding population. The Saudis have relied on U.S. companies to buy oil in 
order to sustain the Kingdom, but Ӧzev rightly sees this system of economic management as 
troublesome for the Saudi state.  
 The U.S. interest in Saudi Arabia grew from oil to its strategic geographic location and 
religious obligation to fight the spread of Communism in the aftermath of World War II. Oil 
remained an important factor in the U.S.’s actions in the Middle East and it was equally 
important in keeping the economy of Saudi Arabia healthy. The Truman administration ensured 
the loyalty of Saudi Arabia through economic and military support. When the U.S. declared 
support for the creation of Israel, Saudi Arabia could not afford to anger the U.S. though King 
Ibn Saud expressed his disappointment. The anti-imperialist U.S. Saudi Arabia allied with was 
expanding its interest in the Middle East as Britain left the region.  
 The growing need for oil in Europe and the U.S. after World War II ensured Western 
media covered events throughout the Middle Eat and the twentieth century. The importance of 
Saudi Arabia within the larger arena of Middle Eastern politics was not lost on journalists and 
foreign correspondents. Newspapers were heavily involved in covering the evolving political 
situation in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East because of the West’s reliance upon oil. Besides 
the latest news coming out of the Middle East, articles covering the complicated political 
situation circulated throughout the U.S. and Europe in order to inform the public on foreign 
Bell 
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affairs associated with Western interests. U.S. newspaper articles like “Nabob’s Chariot” by 
Irving Wallace sensationalized the Middle East but did not give an accurate portrayal of events 
in the Middle East.20 Events in the Middle East were not well understood by the U.S. populace 
because news from Southwest Asia was not well represented. This left the U.S. government able 
to decide how to act in the Middle East without interference from the U.S. population—except 
for the better-informed Zionist lobby.  
The U.S. and Britain worked closely with royal leaders of the Arab world to protect their 
oil investments in the Middle East. This correspondence between the U.S. government and Saudi 
Arabia is heavily documented in letters, concessions, diplomatic, and trade agreements. Letters 
between the President of the U.S. and the King of Saudi Arabia established the basis of U.S.-
Saudi relations. They served to create an understanding between two leaders of nations 
fundamentally different in their ideologies. Reports made to President Truman discussing the 
“Palestine problem” were heavily biased by the Zionist lobby.21 This influenced the Truman 
administration to support the creation of Israel, which strained relations between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia. While there are many letters and correspondence between the leaders of Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. available, there is a severe lack of Saudi documents because much of it is in 
Arabic. Additionally, Saudi Arabia doesn’t have a free media like the U.S. and therefore news 
outlets from Saudi Arabia cannot publicly criticize the government without fearing for their 
safety. These primary sources tell the story of the U.S.’s expansion into the Middle East and 
emphasizes the growing importance of Saudi Arabia to U.S. policy in Southwest Asia through 
the Cold War.  
                                                          
20 Irving Wallace, "Nabob's Chariot," 119-122. 
21 The “Palestine problem” references the questioning of Britain whether to allow Palestine to be governed by the 
native Arabs or give Palestine to the displaced European Jews.  
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 The increase in the demand for oil is what originally caused the U.S. to seek oil 
concessions in the Middle East. When oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia the U.S. government 
became increasingly interested in establishing an embassy in Saudi Arabia.22 The U.S. relied on 
oil economically and U.S. experts were afraid the U.S. would run out of oil during the Second 
World War.23 The oil concession made between SOCAL and Saudi Arabia was incentivized 
through loans and economic profit to Saudi Arabia that the Kingdom desperately needed in order 
to keep their expanded territory under control. The U.S. government became officially involved 
with Saudi Arabia in 1943 when two sons of King Ibn Saud went to Washington DC to meet 
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Additionally, the U.S. sent ambassadors and moved to set 
up an embassy the same year. Despite these earlier diplomatic effects, historians (U.S. and Saudi 
alike) agree the true beginning between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia started with the first and only 
meeting between King Ibn Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Valentine’s day of 
1945. Roosevelt died six weeks after the meeting, but he was able to gain the trust of the Saudi 
King in a single meeting.  
Winston Churchill tried to imitate the American meeting with the Saudi’s in Egypt days 
after the initial meeting between King Ibn Saud and Roosevelt, but he was insensitive to Islamic 
customs and King Ibn Saud was already wary of the imperialist country.24 Roosevelt’s 
administration established the practice of protecting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect 
American oil interests in the region. Bronson emphasizes, oil was not the only interest the U.S. 
had in Saudi Arabia. As the Cold War developed in the Middle East, the U.S. decided to use 
Saudi Arabia as a buffer to communist backed nationalism in the region. As When the Cold War 
                                                          
22 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 1. 
23 Ibid., 15.  
24 Ibid., 17, 21. 
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heated up, Saudi Arabia also appealled to the U.S. as a refueling station against the Soviet 
Union.25 The mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries would not have come to 
fruition if not for the Middle Eastern oil rush during the 1930s. The involvement of the U.S. in 
the region has become more complex through the years as a result of increasing U.S. 
involvement into Middle Eastern politics.  
Britain was the prominent Western influence in the Middle East before World War II. 
Figure 1 shows the extent of Western imperial influence in Southwest Asia, with Saudi Arabia 
being one of the only nations independent from European colonization and imperial tactics.26 
Surrounded by the encroaching British Empire, Saudi Arabia felt their freedom threatened if they 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 15-17. 
26 "The Middle East in 1930," map, Middle East Maps, accessed May 25, 2019, 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/mideast-1930.gif.  
Figure 1, "The Middle East in 1930," Map, Middle East Maps, accessed May 25, 2019, 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/mideast-1930.gif. 
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decided to ally with the British government and allow them oil concessions in the Eastern 
Province.27 The first Kingdom of Saudi Arabia fell because of the Turkish lead Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, King Ibn Saud did not trust the British Empire not to impose themselves upon his 
Kingdom. The threat of imperialism drove Saudi Arabia to give their available oil concessions to 
the U.S. oil company SOCAL.28 The creation of the U.S.-Saudi alliance in 1945 was rooted in 
U.S. interest and access to profitable Saudi oil. Likewise, Saudi Arabia relied on the money 
provided by the U.S. oil concessions and the start of military support from the U.S.29 
 The meeting Roosevelt conducted with King Ibn Saud lead to an understanding between 
the two leaders on the brewing issue of the state of Israel. King Ibn Saud spoke out on the 
creation of Israel many times, both before and after its official creation. By one report made in 
1943, King Ibn Saud tried to explain the current situation in Palestine to an American audience. 
He denied the Jewish claim to Palestine because they were conquered by Romans, who in turn 
were conquered by Muslims hundreds of years ago. According to King Ibn Saud, “Thus I hold 
the demands of the Jews upon this land [Palestine] an error; first because it constitutes an 
injustice against the Arabas, and the Moslems in general; and secondly because it causes 
dissensions and disturbances between the Moslems and their friends the Allies.”30 The King 
continued to say that countries in Europe and the Americas should make room for Jewish 
refugees rather than push this burden on the Palestinians. He denounced the Jewish claim to 
Israel for the remainder of his reign. King Ibn Saud’s disapproval of the creation of Israel was 
and remains the standard disposition of Arabs throughout Southwest Asia. In King Ibn Saud’s 
                                                          
27 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 17-21. 
28 Ibid., 34. 
29 Ibid., 21-23, 45-48. 
30 "King Ibn Saud Declares Opposition to Jewish Claims on Palestine," Jewish Telegraphic Agency (New York), 
May 31, 1943, 10th ed., sec. 127, accessed May 11, 2019, https://www.jta.org/1943/05/31/archive/king-ibn-saud-
declares-opposition-to-jewish-claims-on-palestine.  
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statement, he urged the “Allies” to prevent Jews native to Palestine from buying or taking 
property away from Arab Palestinians with his own assurance that Jews’ rights and safety would 
be guaranteed by the Arabs.31 The influx of European Jews into Palestine was viewed similarly 
to colonialism. Therefore, King Ibn Saud urged the U.S. to cancel their support of a Jewish state 
in Palestine—he saw the U.S. as anti-imperial and expected it to support the Palestinians right to 
self-govern.  
 Each Presidential administration since Franklin D. Roosevelt has established a different 
policy and attitude towards Saudi Arabia and the problems plaguing the Middle East. This is 
common in American politics, but fast changing American politics were unfamiliar to the 
traditionalist royal family of Saud. The first source of tension in the U.S.-Saudi relationship was 
a change in administration policy when President Truman was elected. After Roosevelt’s 
meeting with King Ibn Saud, Roosevelt wrote a letter to King Ibn Saud regarding American 
policy towards the Israel-Palestine situation. Roosevelt promised King Ibn Saud “that no 
decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with 
both Arabs and Jews.”32 According to Bronson, this letter represented to the Saudi government a 
promise made not just by Roosevelt, but by the American government.33 When the U.S. 
supported Israeli independence under Truman, it was seen as a betrayal of Roosevelt’s promise 
by the Saudi government. Shifting U.S. policies from administration to administration continued 
to cause irritation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia throughout the Cold War. President 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Franklin D. Roosevelt to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, April 5, 1945, in The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, page number, accessed April 28, 2019, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad161.asp. 
33 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 42. 
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Roosevelt understood the importance of keeping Saudi Arabia a happy ally, but the Truman 
administration was swayed by the Zionist lobby. 
 The U.S.-Saudi relationship during the Truman administration had to contend with a 
growing Zionist movement in the U.S. and a weakening British presence in the Middle East. The 
support given to the creation of Israel by the Truman administration continues to influence 
Middle Eastern politics today, but also managed to give the U.S. a more secure foothold in the 
region. Saudi Arabia tried to dissuade the U.S. from giving in to Zionist pressures and instead 
force the Axis powers to grant land to the Jews.34 The U.S. had far more Zionist lobbyists 
fighting for the creation of a Jewish state than Arab sympathizers that understood the creation of 
Israel meant war in the Middle East. Truman was more concerned with how his constituents 
viewed his stance on the “Palestine problem” than what ramifications the U.S. would have to 
face if Israel was created and backed by the U.S.35  
 Being concerned with the public opinion regarding the Palestine problem, the Truman 
administration made use of a survey done by researcher Hadley Cantril on public opinion of the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in March of 1945.36 The researcher acknowledges the 
difficult scale of such a survey, noting that: “The subject is one where variations in the wording 
of questions would undoubtedly produce significant differences in percentages…”37 This 
admission alone should give the reader significant pause when using the numbers presented in 
this survey as reliable figures regarding the controversial Palestine problem. Cantril found that 
                                                          
34 "King Ibn Saud Declares Opposition to Jewish Claims on Palestine," Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 
35 Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in 
London.” The White House, October 4, 1946. Accessed May 20, 2019. 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1763&st=227&st1=. 
36 "Public Opinion Toward Creation of Jewish State in Palestine," Hadley Cantril to David Niles, April 4, 1945, in 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, accessed April 15, 2019, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/dbq/docs/israel/TrumanIsrael_handouts.pdf. 
37 Ibid.  
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roughly half of the total population had heard about the creation of a Jewish state (Yes 53% and 
No 47%). Forty-seven percent of those asked had no previous knowledge of the Palestine 
problem. This emphasizes the lack of information available to the American public about the 
Middle East and lack of understanding in regards to the Palestine problem.  
The second question in the survey is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, half of those 
participating haven’t had a chance to research the Palestine problem themselves and must rely on 
information given to them by the researcher to decide on the creation of a Jewish state. Secondly, 
the information provided by the researcher provides more context for the Jewish argument than 
the Arab one. On behalf of the Zionist argument Cantril mentions, “the best way to save the lives 
of many European Jews persecuted and made homeless by the Nazis…if the Jews have a 
national homeland they will be better able to help themselves.”38 When discussing the Arab 
argument, Cantril boils it down to there are more Arabs in Palestine and “open conflict would 
probably break out.”39 He doesn’t mention the large migration of Jews to Palestine (100,000) that 
the U.S. pushing for, or the fear of a larger land grab by foreign peoples.40 The information given 
to the participants of the survey is biased and the results show this clearly. Despite half of the 
participants not knowing about the Palestine problem (47 percent), 59 percent of participants 
were in favor of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.41 Looking at only the participants that had 
an opinion as to the creation of a Jewish state, the position of participants were three to one in 
favor of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.42 The disparity between participants who had 
heard of the Palestine problem and those who were opposed to the creation of a Jewish state in 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Truman, “Statement by the President Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London.” 
41 "Public Opinion Toward Creation of Jewish State in Palestine," Hadley Cantril to David Niles. 
42 Ibid. 
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Palestine show the biased nature of the survey questions. The Truman administration pointed to 
surveys such as this to explain U.S. support for the creation of Israel, but the biased survey 
purposefully pushes the cause of the Jews as necessary and humane.  
U.S. officials who had a deeper understanding of the Middle East urged the Truman 
administration to rethink supporting Zionist movements. A memo from Edward Stettinius Jr. 
(U.S. Secretary of State) to President Truman on April 18, 1945—less than a week after Truman 
took office as President—illustrates the urgency with which officials like Stettinius matched the 
Zionist lobby. In his memo, Stettinius explains to President Truman that “the question of 
Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the 
plight of the Jews of Europe.”43 Without mentioning specific Arab nations, Stettinius reminded 
President Truman of the importance of the alliance’s present in Southwest Asia: “we have 
interests in that area which are vital to the United States.”44 Stettinius referenced the U.S.’s need 
for Saudi oil to convey the economic importance of the U.S.-Saudi alliance. The creation of a 
Jewish nation state in Palestine was considered a threat to majority Arab nations in Southwest 
Asia and Stettinius understood the Palestine problem went deeper than wanting to help the 
Jewish victims of the holocaust. Potential U.S. support for a Jewish nation in Palestine 
threatened Arab powers because they viewed the Jewish nation state as foreign invaders greedy 
for more land and power, but also because America used its new global influence to make 
decisions effecting Arabs half a world away.  
The plight and hardships of the displaced European Jews were made readily apparent to 
the Truman administration by the Zionist lobby. The only solution offered by Zionists was to 
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create a Jewish homeland where they could protect themselves—specifically in Palestine, the 
protested ancient homeland of the Jews. A report by Earl G Harrison (U.S. Representative on the 
Intergovernmental Commission on Refugees) on Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-War Europe 
explicitly states, “the only real solution, of the problem lies in the quick evacuation of all non-
repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to Palestine.”45 It was not considered 
possible to reliably re-integrate hundreds of thousands of Jews back into their native homelands. 
An “Interim Report of American Jewish Conference Representatives in American Occupied 
Zone of Germany with Reference to Jewish Displaced Persons Centre” emphasized the poverty 
and torture already put upon the Jews in Austria and Germany.46 In their report they claim, 
“these Jews do not desire to remain in Germany. They feel…that they can never be rehabilitated 
in a land whose every square inch they regard as being saturated with the blood of their 
families….The overwhelming majority have expressed their desire to go to Palestine…as soon as 
possible.”47 Again, the Truman administration was flooded with reports and testimony from the 
Zionist movement that Palestine was the only option for the displaced Jews of Europe. These 
reports tended to overlook the majority Arab presence in Palestine and the tensions a Jewish 
nation in Palestine created.   
Saudi Arabia was not as economically independent in 1945 as today. They relied heavily 
on financial assistance from both the U.S. and Britain. The oil concession between ARAMCO 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was necessary for the economy of the Kingdom, but it was not 
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lucrative enough to sustain the Kingdom alone. In a letter to President Truman in July of 1945, 
King Ibn Saud stresses his country’s need for U.S. assistance.48 Historian Geoff Simons focuses 
specifically on this aspect of the U.S.-Saudi relationship; he claims that the U.S.’s economic and 
military support of Saudi Arabia despite ideological differences is an indication of the U.S. using 
Saudi Arabia as a ward of American imperialism.49 King Ibn Saud insistence in securing the 
financial aid started by President Roosevelt alongside the financial aid traditionally given to the 
Kingdom by Britain does support Simons argument that Saudi Arabia was being groomed by the 
U.S. as a client.50 
The U.S. partnered with Britain to form the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that 
was tasked with finding a solution to the Palestine problem. Two world powers deciding where 
to move hundreds of thousands of refugees with limited input from the effected parties (Jews and 
Arabs) is inherently imperial. The U.S. had no place in deciding how Palestine should be 
governed, but the Truman administration felt immense pressure to be a part of the solution to the 
Palestine conflict between Jew and Arab. Recommendation number three in a “Report to the 
United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,” made by the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry finds an excellent middle ground for all Abrahamic 
religions laying claim to Palestine.51 This recommendation was never followed by the U.S. 
government, but it is important to note the U.S. was aware of possible compromises that were 
more favorable to the Arab majority. This recommendation states: “That Palestine shall be 
neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state…because it is a Holy Land, Palestine is not, and can 
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never become, a land which any race or religion can justly claim it as its very own.”52 This 
recommended action doesn’t go against Roosevelt’s promise to the King of Saudi Arabia by 
taking into account the need of Jews and Arabs (as well as Christians) to share this Holy Land. 
This solution to the Palestine problem was not followed in part because Britain and the Zionist 
lobby was pushing for a specifically Jewish nation in Palestine. Once Britain decided to abandon 
their protection of Palestine in the Middle East, the U.S. had to decide quickly whether they 
would support the creation of Israel or leave the Jewish community to fend for themselves in the 
Arab dominated Middle East.53 The U.S.’s support of Israel without proper considerations made 
for Arab Palestinians cemented the U.S. as a imperial power in the Middle East interested in 
gaining clients similar to how Britain had throughout the early twentieth century.  
From the start of the Truman administration President Truman was pressured by the 
Zionist lobby, officials in contact with Saudi Arabia, and King Ibn Saud himself to address the 
U.S.’s stance and agenda relating to the Palestine problem. On August 16, 1945 the White House 
released a statement saying that the Palestine problem was being handled by the British 
government with Jewish and Arab representatives to find the most cooperative solution to 
helping the displaced Jews of Europe.54 This statement made by the Truman administration 
suggests that part of the solution to the Palestine problem will be the mass movement of Jewish 
refugees to Palestine. In order to suggest that Palestine take on Jewish refugees, the President 
moved to create special legislation that allowed a specific number of displaced European 
peoples, “including Jews,” to enter the U.S.55 This move by Truman showed that the U.S. was 
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willing to take their fair share of Jewish refugees, but still insisted that the solution to the 
Palestine problem must move Jews to Palestine.  
Shortly after the release of the White House statement on August 16, 1946, President 
Truman released his own statement on October 4, 1946 to share his own opinion and goals 
regarding the Palestine problem.56 Before this statement, President Truman and Roosevelt 
refused to commit to a particular course of action regarding the Palestine problem. The most 
troubling aspect of Truman’s statement in regard to the U.S.-Saudi relationship is the U.S.’s 
insertion into deciding the solution to the Palestine problem. Additionally, the Arabs present in 
Palestine and King Ibn Saud’s concerns were ignored in Truman’s plan to help create a Jewish 
state “in an adequate area of Palestine.”57 The Truman administration’s decision to discredit the 
creation of a bi-national state and dedicate itself to supporting the Jewish nation economically 
not only insulted the Saudi’s inability to get financial assistance through Congress, but 
demonstrates the U.S.’s determination to insert their policies in the lucrative Middle East. Saudi 
Arabia’s persistent show of disapproval for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine didn’t 
matter as much as the public and Congressional opinion to the Truman administration—as 
Truman said in his statement release.58 This is because the U.S. knew that Saudi Arabia was 
economically and militarily dependent on them, as Simons discusses in his claims of Saudi 
Arabia acting as the client of U.S. imperialism in Southwest Asia.  
King Ibn Saud replied to the White House and President Truman’s statement in a letter 
on October 15, 1946.59 The King expressed his surprise at Truman’s support for the creation of a 
                                                          
56 Truman, “Statement by the President Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to President Harry S. Truman, October 15, 1946, in Office of the Historian, accessed May 
20, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d554. 
Bell 
 
21 
 
Jewish state because he claimed it went against the promises made to Saudi Arabia by both the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations. He argued that the Jews wanted more land than just 
Palestine and would try and expand their territories, which later happened as a result of the Six 
Days War (June 5-June 10, 1967). Throughout the letter King Ibn Saud continually described the 
push to create a Jewish state in Palestine as “Zionist aggression” and appealed to the U.S.’s 
identity as freedom fighters:  
I am certain that Your Excellency and the American people cannot support right, justice, and 
equity and fight for them in the rest of the world while denying them to the Arabs in their 
country, Palestine, which they have inherited from their ancestors from Ancient Times.60 
 
King Ibn Saud made these claims before President Truman released a statement in support of the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, but they did not help sway the President of chancing his 
position. President Truman replied to the King’s concerns on October 18, 1946, “I do not 
consider that…my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense 
represent an action hostile to the Arab people.”61 Saudi Arabia was an important asset for the 
U.S. in the Middle East, but the support for a Jewish state in Palestine was too much for Truman 
to ignore. Saudi Arabia was unable to retaliate against the U.S. in response to President 
Truman’s statement because they were financially and militarily reliant upon U.S. aid. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not able to survive or thrive without the help of the U.S. and the 
Truman administration used that knowledge to secure U.S. influence over two nations in the 
Middle East.  
 King Ibn Saud’s bad health and old age caught up with him in his final years and he was 
unable to rule efficiently. He had to rely on the help of his eldest sons to deal with matters of 
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state until he died in 1953. The eldest two sons of King Ibn Saud, Prince Saud and Prince Faisal, 
did not hold the same partialness toward the U.S. as their father, but their struggle for power took 
up most of their attention.62 The U.S.’s support and recognition of Israel alarmed and enraged the 
princes, but like their father they could do little to retaliate against the U.S. because Saudi Arabia 
relied on U.S. support. The Saud royal family had to come to terms with sharing the U.S. as a 
Western support with Israel.  
 In return for Saudi Arabia’s support in the Middle East, the U.S. laid out their plans for 
support in a letter from President Truman to King Ibn Saud on October 31, 1950.63 In the letter 
President Truman outlined three important factors in the U.S-Saudi alliance. These factors would 
continue to hold the U.S. and Saudi Arabia together throughout the Cold War. First and 
foremost, President Truman speaks of the importance of fighting off the “forces of Communism” 
together. He goes on to praise the King’s efforts to further develop Saudi Arabia and “improve 
the standards of living for your people.” Finally, he promises that any threat made to Saudi 
Arabian borders would be of immediate concern to the U.S.64 The Eisenhower administration 
followed the Truman administration in emphasizing these three points in the alliance between the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia.  
 During the Cold War, the U.S.’s interest in the Middle East expanded from oil to 
containment of the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia served as a strategic point for the U.S. to keep the 
region under Western influence. Political events throughout Southwest Asia were manipulated 
by the U.S. in order to keep communism from spreading—while simultaneously keeping the 
region under U.S. influence. Countries that allied with the Soviet Union, like Egypt, were a 
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threat and the U.S. used Saudi Arabia and Israel to break these nationalistic countries of their 
Soviet ties—mainly through proxy wars, like Yemen. As the Cold War developed, the U.S. 
became more involved in the politics of the region and strengthened their ties with both Israel 
and Saudi Arabia.  
 In the decade after the Suez Crisis, Israel became of increasing value to the U.S. as 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan remained outside of American control and Saudi Arabia appeared to 
lose stability under the son of King Ibn Saud, King Saud. Israel served the U.S. as a strong 
foothold in the Middle East. The Eisenhower administration’s containment method used Israel to 
keep Arab nationalism from spreading during the Cold War.65 According to Douglas Little, 
Eisenhower’s containment policy and Kennedy’s promises of American protection lead to the 
Johnson administration’s closer relationship with Israel, against Saudi wishes.66 The strong 
protection policy of Israel set by these three administrations were heavily influenced by the 
Soviet Union’s looming presence in the form of the Arab nationalism movement. Despite the 
U.S. backing Nasser instead of Israel during the Suez Crisis, the U.S. was opposed to the 
nationalist states in the area because of their suspicious ties to the Soviets. Kennedy’s decision to 
try and halt nuclear production in Israel by offering American protection in case of attack by 
Arab nations was motivated by a want to avoid a nuclear war between trigger-happy Israel and 
the Soviet backed Nasser.67  
The U.S. backed Israel during the Six Days War and the U.S. was glad to see that Israel 
could defeat the liberation movements in the Middle East. Israel’s show of power made them a 
more poignant ally in the region, but Israel’s insistence upon keeping land conquered during the 
                                                          
65 Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68," (International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4, November 1993), 563. 
66 Ibid., 563-564. 
67 Ibid., 569. 
Bell 
 
24 
 
conflict despite the U.S. pushing the U.N.’s proposal for peace through returning land put the 
U.S. at a disadvantage in the region. According to Little, the Israeli-U.S. partnership was not as 
influential in the region as was originally thought and the country gained access to nuclear 
weapons while anti-Western Arab groups and nationalist organizations grew closer to the Soviets 
in response to American-Israeli policy.68 While American policy makers did not achieve their 
goals with Israel, the reasoning behind their actions were motivated by attempts to stop the 
liberation movements from converting to communism and removing American influence in the 
area. The U.S. isolated themselves not only from nationalist movements by backing Israel, but 
also from other Arab nations that wanted Palestine to be reinstated and protected from a foreign 
government.  
As liberation movements were gaining momentum in the Middle East, the U.S. decided 
to take a hands-on approach to controlling policies in the region. A good example of the U.S. 
attempting to change politics in the region is Iran. The U.S. backed the 1953 coup to rid Iran of 
the elected Prime Minister and empowered the pro-Western monarchy. The U.S. doubted the 
solidarity of the Saudi monarchy during this time and Iran was more appealing as a Western 
supporter. The U.S. continued to back royalist movements in the Middle East, but especially in 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The last Shah of Iran proved to be a great ally to the U.S. as he 
implemented his White Revolution to modernize his country. As the Shah’s vision backfired, his 
people openly opposed his rule. When he was forced to flee his country because of riots and his 
failing health, the U.S. made the controversial decision to take the Shah into the U.S. as a show 
of support for other pro-American monarchies in the Middle East.69 The decision to shield the 
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Shah from his people resulted in a stronger anti-American sentiment as it seemed to cement the 
idea that the Shah was a pawn of the West. The U.S. government knew the U.S. embassy was 
vulnerable to attack and took the risk of accepting the Shah into the U.S. anyway. The students 
who took Embassy staff hostage admitted they wouldn’t have done anything if the U.S. had not 
interfered.70 The blatant use of U.S. power to change the heads of state in order to undermine 
unfavorable policies in the Middle East caused instability and riots in the region. This trend is 
seen in Egypt, Syria, and Afghanistan. The U.S. feared that liberation movements in the Middle 
East would turn communist and threaten control over the region and thus interfered to stop the 
alliance of guerilla groups with the Soviet Union.  
A relationship based off similar interests and goals is best seen in Saudi Arabia and the 
U.S. During the Cold War, the two countries worked well against the Arab nationalists that 
threatened the Saud claim to leadership in the Arab world. The other big threat to the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia was the encroaching Soviet Union through Arab nationalism. The U.S. was so 
focused on keeping control of the oil rich states of the Middle East that they opposed liberation 
movements and Arab nationalism due to a fear of communism in favor of political Islamic 
groups that would later turn against the U.S. once the Soviet Union was dealt with. The actions 
taken by the U.S. during the Cold War has shaped the Middle East into an unstable region that 
the U.S. still has issues with to present day. Relationship the U.S. made during the Cold War, 
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, are still important to American foreign policy, but American 
support for political Islam has dissipated since the Soviet Union’s end. U.S. policy in the Middle 
East was strongly affected by Soviet intervention within the area and fear of the spread of 
communism. This fear lead the U.S. to support suspect groups in Southwest Asia. Issues 
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currently being faced by the U.S. in the Middle East can be traced back to decisions made during 
the Cold War.  
The Roosevelt administration succeeded in creating a strong bond between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia by gaining the trust of King Ibn Saud. After Roosevelt’s death, the Truman 
administration strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia by facilitating the creation of the Dhahran air 
base and increasing the revenue received by the Saudi government for exporting oil. President 
Truman’s support of the creation of Israel in Palestine tested the relationship between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia, but the U.S. supported the Kingdom so much it was impossible for Saudi 
Arabia fully support Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in fighting against Israel. The Kingdom needed 
U.S. economic and military support to maintain its government. Without foreign aid the 
Kingdom could not sustain itself.  
The U.S. increased their influence in Southwest Asia from 1945-1953. As Britain 
retreated from the Middle East in the late 1940s the U.S. took up their support of Israel. The 
Truman administration increased its support of Saudi Arabia during this time which enabled the 
U.S. to create a permanent ally in the region. Despite several appeals from King Ibn Saud to 
allow the Arabs to govern Palestine independently, the Truman administration was swayed by 
the Zionist lobby into supporting the creation of Israel. With Israel’s independence in 1948 the 
U.S. had two allies in the Middle East relying on their aid. This allowed the U.S. to become the 
biggest influential power in Southwest Asia. The U.S.’s influence and power in the Middle East 
stem from its domination of Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Truman administration.  
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